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The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area was profoundly reshaped under 
European imperialism, especially by the “peace to end all peace” (Fromkin 1989) 
imposed after WWI. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership was designed to deal with the 
long-term consequence: a dysfunctional regional states system whose instabilities were 
always liable to spill across to the north of the Mediterranean. The partnership would 
establish a liberal peace on Europe’s Mediterranean borders via the export of economic 
and political reform, via soft rather than hard power, through the spread of norms by 
example, quite different from the failed US attempt at military hegemony, epitomized by 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  
 
Conceptual Framing: Liberalism vs. Structuralism, Soft vs. Hard Power 
The EU relation to MENA allows testing of rival IR paradigms’ understanding of core-
periphery relations. In the liberal paradigm, EU-MENA relations can be interpreted as 
an attempt to use soft power to export a liberal peace through norm diffusion 
mechanisms such as linkage and leverage (Levitsky and Way 2005) and norm cascading 
(Finnamore and Sikkink 1998) that produces a benign win-win situation for both. The 
opposite structuralist paradigm, including Neo-Gramscianism (Cox 1996) and world 
systems theory (Arrighi and Silver 2001), sees norm export as an instrument of the 
global hegemon’s attempt to establish the dominance over the periphery of the world 
capitalist core’s finance capital. The equivalent of soft power in this paradigm, 
ideological hegemony, is merely the ideational superstructure of hard power, rooted in 
economic dominance, and backed up by military intervention where needed. It is 
moreover, part of what Clark (2001) depicted as an attempt to reverse the power 
diffusion from the spread of sovereignty to the periphery under de-colonialization so 
that, rather than a win-win outcome, various forms of resistance in the periphery may 
lead to “imperial overstretch” (Burbach and Tarbell 2004; Marshall 2016) in which the 
core incurs high costs, including “blowback” on itself of the turbulence in the periphery 
that precipitates (Johnson 2004). Moreover, contradictions between the use of hard and 
soft power, and in the norms exported, e.g. between neo-liberalism and democracy, may 
debilitate the core’s drive into the periphery. Europe fits into this paradigm if one 
envisions a “collective hegemon”, led by the US, but partnered with Europe, in which a 
certain division of labour is agreed in MENA, with the US specializing in hard power and 
the EU in soft power.  
Indeed, this chapter will show that despite Europe’s benign self-image, the 
distinction between the European and American projects was only ever one of degree. 
The asymmetric hub-and-spokes relations created by the Euro-Med project reproduced 
the power imbalance between core and periphery and served European interests first, 
much as structuralist approaches expect. The thrust of the Euro—Med partnership, 
namely the parallel export of neo-liberalism (with its associated inequalities) and the 
attempted export of “democracy,” helped to precipitate the Arab Uprising. This 
”imperial overstretch” resulted in the spread of both failed and more repressive states, 
rather than a liberal peace, and led to a spillover (blowback) of the consequences—
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mass migration and terrorism—across European borders that threaten the very 
survival of the EU. What went wrong? 
 
From European Imperialism to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
The Heritage of European Imperialism 
If the Middle East’s dysfunctions now afflict Europe, the origins of those dysfunctions go 
back to the profound reshaping of the region under the impact of European imperialism. 
Arbitrary boundary drawing by Britain and France permanently fragmented the region 
into a multitude of weak and insecure states, grossly violating regional identity, 
generating several enduring border conflicts and stateless peoples, sources of enduring 
irredentism. Israel, a colonial settler state established under British auspices at the 
expense of indigenous people, was bound to be rejected; yet its unmatched network of 
strategic depth in the West made it the dominant regional military power. The region 
was incorporated into a global economic division of labour, as the break-up of the large 
Ottoman market snapped regional interdependencies and its economic links were 
reoriented to the imperial core (s). The concentration of much of MENA’s enormous oil 
wealth in tiny Western client states ensured those countries exported capital surpluses 
to the West while larger MENA states with the land and labour potential for diversified 
economies lacked capital.  
 The Western powers faced nationalist resistance from the outset, but did not 
depart without a struggle. In the Suez war of 1956 Britain and France, together with 
Israel, attacked Nasserite Egypt; the standard-bearer of Arab nationalism that had led 
resistance to the West’s attempt, under the Baghdad Pact, to sustain control of the 
region. But the war so aroused nationalism that it led, instead, to Europe’s political 
recession from the region, ultimately culminating in Britain’s 1974 military withdrawal 
from the Gulf. This left, from the viewpoint of the West, a “vacuum” which the US 
gradually began to fill.  
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
 While withdrawing militarily from the region, European states, notably France 
and Britain, retained interests there and Europe as a whole was affected by growing 
interdependencies with MENA and needed, therefore, to remain engaged with it. The 
1970s Euro-Arab Dialogue was a response to the oil crisis that threatened European 
economies and which several European states sought to alleviate through arms for oil 
trade. Energy security continued central to European relations with MENA: in 1995 of 
the 9.6 million bpd of oil imported by Europe 5.5 (57%) came from MENA (Marr 1998; 
Hollis 1997; Holden 2010). Geographical proximity exposed Europe to flows of migrants 
from its southern Mediterranean neighbourhood, thought likely to greatly increase if 
growing youth unemployment in the region was not addressed thorough economic 
development. In 2016 about 13 million foreign-born immigrants and over 20 million 
Muslims in total lived in Europe and made up four to five percent of its total population 
(Hackett 2016); the EU has sought to secure the cooperation of MENA governments in 
containing such flows. In the mid-1990s there was alarm at the anti-Westernism 
aroused in the south of the Mediterranean but also among European Muslims by the 
1990 Gulf war. The Algerian civil war precipitated European fears of a spill-over of 
instability to the north: failed states, stagnant economies and civil wars were seen as a 
source of refugee flows, drug trafficking, and terrorism. As the EU gradually came into 
being as a collective actor with its own identity, it became ambitious to reassert 
Europe’s influence over its MENA near neighbourhood, both to enhance its economic 
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advantages in the area against competitors, and to stabilize the region by projecting the 
“normative” power of a liberal peace (Tonra and Cavatorta 2007; Youngs 2004).  
 The centrepiece of Europe’s effort was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) launched by the 1995 Barcelona Declaration between Europe and southern 
Mediterranean states, with the avowed aim of transforming the Mediterranean region 
into an area of shared prosperity, hence stability. The heart of the scheme was a cross-
regional free trade zone that, in the EU’s liberal paradigm, was expected to generate 
prosperity that would dilute radicalism and conflict. Security challenges emanating 
from the southern Mediterranean were seen as deriving from economic and political 
failures in MENA that could be pre-empted through socio-economic reforms launched in 
cooperation with MENA countries (Youngs 2003). It was also expected that economic 
and political liberalization would foster each other and the scheme at least nominally 
made aid and trade conditional on political reform.  
The Internal Contradictions of the EMP  
  While the EMP was supposed to generate prosperity in the partner nations, in 
the immediate term, it actually worsened the conditions of trade for MENA (Joffe 1998: 
66-68). Europe’s trade agreements with MENA states in the pre-neo-liberal 1970s had 
granted them preferential access to European markets for some of their industrial and 
agricultural products, (Salame 1998: 35) and MENA states were allowed, reflective of 
their lower levels of development, to protect their own industries. EMP agreements not 
only required the opening of MENA markets to European industrial exports (and those 
of Europe-based US multinationals) but also committed MENA countries to the global 
trade regime, e.g. on services and protection of intellectual property rights, that favours 
the north. The only improvement for MENA was slightly increased EU quotas for its 
agricultural exports (Miller and Mishraf 2005; Marks 1998; Parfitt 1997; Nienhaus, 
1999).  
 The EMP gave MENA partner countries 12 years to dismantle their tariffs and 
accorded them financial aid to upgrade their industries so they could compete on the 
wider market and also to ease the balance of payment deficit that was expected in the 
transition period when European exports to the region would be more competitive than 
indigenous production. MENA economic takeoff would, it was argued, be facilitated by 
forcing its industries, through tariff reductions and technical assistance, to move from 
Import Substitute Industrialization (ISI) to industrial export strategies. Privatization of 
state owned industries was also encouraged. The requirement that MENA states 
increase administrative transparency and an investor-friendly regulatory framework 
was expected to encourage investment in the region. Nevertheless, the elimination of 
tariffs and barriers for EU industrial exports damaged MENA small and medium-sized 
businesses (60% of Morocco’s and 30% of Tunisian’s industries were not expected to 
withstand European competition) (Schumacher 2004). MENA exports to the EU did 
increase but Europe’s exports to the region grew faster, at an annual average of 8 
percent since the mid-1990s (Schumacher 2010); the EU ran a trade surplus with its 
southern partners in the years since 2000. As for investment, the EMP was expected to 
divert it to the EU since under the hub-and spokes arrangement, investors in the EU hub 
now got access to MENA partners, too (the spokes), while investing in the spokes would 
not give access to other spokes in the absence of a MENA free trade zone, which the hub 
and spokes system discouraged. In practice, North Africa and the Gulf region together 
accounted for only 3 percent of European Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) outside the 
EU in 2003-2008 (Schumacher 2010: 13) In the first decade of the EMP, 1994-2005, the 
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average income of the south as percentage of the north declined slightly to 18.1%. As 
Joffe (1998: 66-8) observed, no economy has ever developed under the economic 
openness the EMP mandated.  
 Rather, its actual effect was to generate crony capitalism. Regimes used neo-
liberal discourse and pressures from the EU and International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) to legitimize privatization and structural adjustment as the inevitable responses 
to the demands of globalization. Privatizations of public sectors were used to legitimize 
appropriation of public assets by ruling elites and their families and cronies, thereby 
turning public into private monopolies. Tellingly, IFI’s held up as models of good 
governance Tunisia and Egypt, where the cronies of Gamal Mubarak and the Ben Ali 
family took advantage of their pressures for privatization to turn public sector assets 
into private monopolies. 
 For Dostal (2009), the underlying problem of the Euro-Med project was the EU’s 
post-Cold War adoption and export of neo-liberal ideology, with its stress on a market 
that favours corporations at the expense of the Social Charter; this was a reflection, 
Grahl (2004) argued, of the dominance of business interests over the EU that was 
naturally replicated in EU external policy toward MENA. Arguably the EMP was an 
instrument through which Europe, was acting, together with the US and IFIs, as part of a 
“collective hegemon,” deploying a combination of incentives and pressures to force 
MENA states to open their economies to Western capitalist penetration, and to extend 
the structural power of core capital over the periphery (Holden 2010: 15; Cavatorta and 
Durac 2010:8). 
 MENA’s acceptance of this suboptimal outcome reflected the process by which 
the partnership was constructed: the EU negotiated agreements individually with each 
southern partner rather than collectively (and separately from the Gulf countries, with 
their greater bargaining leverage); this reflected the fragmentation of MENA countries 
which, producing similar low value added products, saw each other as competitors and 
sought privileged individual bargains with the EU. As in other prisoner’s dilemma 
games, all got worse deals than had they acted together. The effect of the EMP was 
therefore to reconstruct and institutionalize an economic regime reflective of the 
dominance of the world economic core and the dependence of the periphery.  
 This economic trajectory ensured that there would be a sharp disconnect 
between the rhetoric and reality of political reform. Hyde-Price (2006) argues that the 
EU operates as a realist actor, promoting its interests irrespective of the values it 
espouses in principle; hence, primacy is given to the economic side of partnership 
agreements while democratization and human rights are neglected. Indeed, the neo-
liberal generation of crony capitalism in MENA had generated less inclusionary 
authoritarian regimes: ruling coalitions were re-structured, with older populist (labour 
and peasant) constituencies marginalized. Democratization was deterred because the 
masses that pay the cost of neo-liberal policies could be empowered by it, possibly 
bringing Islamist governments to power (Guazzone and Pioppi 2009). Authoritarian 
regimes were needed to implement free trade agreements and other neo-liberal policies 
against the resistance of MENA populations (Tonra and Cavatorta 2007; Cavatorta and 
Durac 2010: 7-8; Kienle 1998). And, Teti (2012) argues, the democratization ostensibly 
urged by the West was of the “thin” variety compatible with neo-liberal globalization-- 
which had limited regional appeal--while Islamic versions and re-distributory forms of 
governance were discouraged. 
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The Atlantic Partnership Debilitates the Mediterranean Partnership 
If the economic provisions of the Mediterranean partnership explain part of what went 
wrong, the partnership was also spoiled at the political level by Europe’s increasing 
complicity in US policy in MENA. In spite of the European origins of many of the current 
problems of the Middle East, regional opinion had seen Europe as benign compared to 
the US. However, the EU‘s regional image declined as its policies converged with those 
of the US. 
 As Europe’s dominance of the region ended, the US increased its military 
presence, relying considerably on hard power against hostile states such as Libya under 
Qaddafi and Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Europe, although much more dependent than 
the US on MENA for trade and energy, relied on America’s military power to provide 
regional security and protection of oil supply routes (Marr 1998). Yet the MENA policies 
of the US, specifically its bias toward Israel and its military interventionism, 
antagonized the region and stimulated or exacerbated the periodic regional crises from 
which Washington then claimed to protect its allies. Europe was seemingly “caught,” 
according to Salame (1998), between MENA and US. For example, the success of 
political cooperation among the Euro-Med partnership countries was predicated on the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict--which was expected in the wake of the Oslo 
Accord; but the failure of the peace process blocked such cooperation (Aliboni 2010). 
There was widespread frustration in the Arab world that the EU could not balance the 
pro-Israeli bias in Washington that allowed Israel to evade a land for peace settlement. 
Another key episode was the 2003 US-mounted regime change in Iraq, in the face of 
opposition in much of Europe that, in destabilizing the region, inflicted high costs on 
Europe. And what made Europe’s alignment with the US dangerous at home was 
America’s unpopularity with the some 12 million European Muslims. However, Europe 
lacked the cohesion to be a unified actor capable of tempering US policies, as was 
brutally exposed by its division over the 2003 Iraq war which made a shambles of 
Europe’s common foreign and defense policy; on the contrary, Europe became ever 
more implicated in US MENA policy, with important consequences for European 
priorities toward MENA.  
 As a consequence of the blowback from US policy, democratization as an EU 
priority was increasingly eclipsed by security concerns, which led European states, 
particularly Britain and France, to sustain close alignments with pro-Western 
authoritarian states, notably Egypt because of its peace with Israel and its self-
representation as a bulwark against Islamic radicalism. After 9/11 and the bombings in 
London and Madrid, the stress shifted further toward security cooperation with 
southern Mediterranean regimes against the common “terrorist” threats from radical 
Islamists, despite rhetorical insistence that political reform was needed to attack the 
roots of terrorism (Seeberg 2010: 299-300: Hollis 2012). EU democracy promotion was 
seen in the Mediterranean south as a rhetorical tool selectively applied against regimes 
that defied the West: thus, rigged elections were accepted in Egypt and Algeria and 
condemned in Iran and a fair election in the Palestinian territories was rejected because 
it brought Islamists to power. This was widely seen as reflecting a preferential 
treatment of regimes that were friendly with the US and Israel or in which Europe had 
oil interests (Idris 2010).  Moreover, Europe was drawn, through its membership in 
NATO, into American occupation regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan and enlisted in the US 
war on terror. Europe’s remaining “soft power” appeared at risk owing to its 
involvement in what was seen as a war on Islam in Middle East public opinion. 
Generally a dynamic was created wherein blowback resulting from US-led 
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interventionism in MENA drove the US and Europe closer together over the resulting 
threats of terrorism (Schumacher 2010). Far from becoming more critical of the costs of 
US policy, Britain and France’s 2011 intervention in Libya seemed to express a desire to 
imitate American-style regime change via hard power (air bombing at little risk of 
casualties for their own forces but substantial “collateral damage” in the target society).  
Europe and the Arab Uprising 
The Euro-Med partnership was supposed to have helped prevent the instability in 
MENA’s neighbourhood that erupted with the Arab Uprising. But Europe bore some 
responsibility for encouraging the Uprising and its post-Uprising policies proved 
ineffective in containing its fallout. What might be called the EU’s post-sovereignty 
outlook had a role in provoking the Uprising while the destabilizing consequences of the 
Uprising has propelled a European move away from this outlook. 
 
The European Role in the Arab Uprising 
In certain indirect ways, Europe, together with the US, played a role in encouraging the 
Arab Uprising. In spite of European security alignments with some of the region’s 
authoritarian governments and the EU’s actually very tepid push for democratization 
(as compared to their more robust insistence on economic neo-liberalism), the post-
sovereignty discourse coming out of Europe, encouraged by the EU’s own apparently 
successful move beyond sovereignty, greatly underestimated and devalued the 
indispensible role of states in a globalized world, even non-democratic ones, and lacked 
sufficient appreciation of the costs of state failure.   
 At both official and NGO levels the rhetoric of democracy promotion was 
unrelenting. Transnational advocacy networks for human rights proliferated in the 
Euro-Mediterranean area over the two decades of the EMP (Feliu 2005). Activists 
trained by US and EU government funded democracy promotion campaigns and 
Western NGOs helped prepare the climate for the Arab Uprising. Although originating in 
America, the so-called non-violent resistance paradigm, popularized by Gene Sharp 
(Arrow 2011) publicized the techniques by which activists could use non-violent 
protest to provoke the collapse of authoritarian regimes; it played some role in 
inspiring the techniques of the Arab Uprising. Also, Europe, inspired by its own move 
away from national sovereignties, was in the vanguard of the normative shift away from 
an  “international society” based on sovereign equal states to one wherein sovereignty 
was made conditional on “good governance” and on states’ fulfilment of their 
“responsibility to protect,” with human rights violations justifying intervention—all as 
judged and implemented by the Western great powers. The “responsibility to protect,” 
doctrine conveyed the misapprehension to dissident activists in MENA that the West 
would be obliged to intervene should repression exceed certain limits and the Libyan 
intervention reinforced this illusion. These post-sovereignty discourses were spread 
within MENA civil societies via Internet technology, which played a key role in 
encouraging the middle class anti-regime political mobilization that spearheaded the 
Arab uprisings. Thus, even as the neo-liberalism promoted by the West reduced MENA 
authoritarian states’ ability to satisfy the welfare of mass publics and widened 
inequalities inside MENA societies, the parallel democratization and post-sovereignty 
discourses helped de-legitimize their authoritarian governance among many citizens. 
The immediate consequence of the contradiction between the neo-liberal economics 
and democratization sides of the Euro-Med partnership produced exact opposite as the 
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EMP ostensibly intended—the widespread de-stabilization of the MENA regional states 
system.  
 European policy toward the uprising states was quite inconsistent from the point 
of view of the values Europe claimed to promote (democracy, responsibility to protect), 
but perfectly understandable as a reflection of geopolitical interests. Thus, in pro-
Western Egypt and Tunisia European governments only abandoned presidents when it 
was clear they were on the way out and in Bahrain, they remained silent on the 
Saudi/Khalifa repression of protestors; by contrast, traditionally anti-Western Libya, 
where the Qaddafi regime had no allies to protect it, was the target of military 
intervention while anti-Western Syria, which did have powerful allies, was targeted 
with economic sanctions (Held and Ulrichsen 2014).  
 Libya: The Libyan intervention exposed cleavages within the EU as Britain and 
France ignored the objections of Germany and of Italy, which had seen Qaddafi as key to 
controlling migration. The rapid mission change from humanitarian protection of 
civilians to regime change, along with the rebuffing of the attempted African Union 
mediated political settlement, exposed the motives of London and Paris: the desire to 
empower friendly clients who would grant oil or reconstruction contracts. The 3000 
sorties flown by European states in Libya cost millions of euros but resulted in a failed 
state that gave jihadist al-Qaida avatars fertile ground to establish themselves in North 
Africa. The spillover of the crisis in Mali soon drew France into a policing operation 
from which it could not easily find an exit and which made it a target for terrorism. The 
Libyan civil war unleashed a massive migrant flow, but although Tunisia and Egypt 
opened their borders to some half a million refugees, the 45,000 headed for Europe 
precipitated attempts to stop the flow (Koser 2012); Italy and Malta, which had opposed 
the intervention, bore the costs for the ambitions of London and Paris. Libya had been a 
bulwark against immigration from Africa and had provided work opportunities that 
dried up after Qaddafi, diverting work seekers to Europe (BBC 2015). Finally, the 
intervention ruined the international climate for the “Responsibility to Protect” 
Doctrine (R2P) since the Western misuse of the UN humanitarian resolution that Russia 
and China had acquiesced in, to serve geopolitical interests, alienated these great 
powers, who had a strong interest in defending the norm of sovereignty against 
Western expansion in MENA at the expense of the multi-polar world order they sought.  
 Syria: the Syrian Uprising began as a mobilization of protestors against a 
repressive authoritarian regime. The West’s discourse of democratization (and financial 
support for dissidents) had helped generate exile groups that, at an early stage, 
promoted the uprising. Moreover, the possibility of external military intervention 
shaped both opposition and regime strategies as protests turned into an uprising: the 
discourse of humanitarian intervention encouraged the opposition to think that the 
regime could not bring the full force of its repressive capabilities against protestors 
without provoking foreign intervention, an expectation that kept alive both their 
resistance and their unwillingness to compromise. External activists told those on the 
ground, pointing to the Libya no-fly zone, that “the international community won’t sit 
and watch you be killed.”(Seeyle 2011) This encouraged Syrians to risk their lives and 
to eschew the compromise with the regime needed for a pacted transition. The Libyan 
intervention gave further momentum to the revolt. The regime, for its part, accelerated 
its repression in the hope of denying the opposition control over parts of Syrian 
territory that could be used, as in Libya, as a staging ground for outside intervention. 
 The EU’s response to regime repression was to slap sanctions on Syria, 
ostensibly to deter the regime from further repression, but which actually made things 
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worse for Syrians. Western sanctions on Syria’s oil sales helped debilitate the regime’s 
capacity to fund state institutions and to maintain its control over wide swaths of the 
country but did not similarly debilitate the regime, per se, which found alternative 
funding sources, e.g. in Iran.  
 As the same time, as the West raised the discourse of the international criminal 
court, regime elites realized that, their bridges burned, there was no way back: they 
would have to stick together and do whatever it took to win. In parallel, Russia and 
China, antagonized by the West’s use of a UN humanitarian resolution to promote 
regime change in Libya moved to protect Syria from a similar scenario. While the West 
in consequence proved unwilling to directly intervene militarily to end the war on 
Western terms (exit of Asad), the US, with support from Britain and France continued to 
insist that Asad had to go and either directly or via the Gulf monarchies, provided large 
amounts of game-changing weaponry, notably anti-tank weapons, much of which was 
transferred to militant Islamist groups. They seized control of significant parts of Syrian 
territory and prevented the regime from recovering territorial control; the stalemate 
and failed state thus produced would otherwise have been quite unlikely.  
 This vacuum was soon filled by the Islamic State that incorporated territory from 
two states, Syria and Iraq, whose governments the Western powers had directly or 
indirectly debilitated. IS soon became a magnet for European Muslims who travelled to 
Syria to join jihadist groups fighting Asad. Ironically, this led the Syrian government’s 
UN delegate to accuse the West of exporting terrorists to Syria. “It’s hard to believe that 
a terrorist who leaves Paris, London, Brussels…and arrives in Syria without a visa, 
without a passport, through dozens of states and the Turkish-Syrian border, has done so 
without intelligence services overseeing these operations.” 
(http://www.euronews.com/2016/04/19/we-re-victims-of-european-terrorism-says-
syria-negotiator-basharja-afari/). The well-grounded fear in European capitals was that 
their radicalized citizens would return home to carry out terrorist attacks at the bidding 
of IS and this fear was soon realized in Paris and Brussels. In parallel, a massive flow of 
Syrian refugees began to swamp Europe’s borders.  
 Europe was split on how to respond to the Syrian crisis: while Germany and 
most other Europeans countries stressed the need to work with Russia to promote a 
political solution, London and Paris held to their demands for Asad to go; without 
having any means to effect such an exit, their stance only encouraged continued 
intransigence and stalemate in Syria. Given that they carried far less of the Syrian 
refugee burden than other European states, especially Greece and Germany, not to 
mention the fact that these two ex-imperial powers bear heavy responsibility for the 
initial creation of a dysfunctional Levant--their stand was bound to damage European 
unity. 
 
European Policy toward the Post-Uprising Crisis 
The EU promised a major rethink of its policies toward MENA after the Uprising 
exposed their flaws. Past support for authoritarian regimes was acknowledged to have 
been a mistake and henceforth the “3Ms”—money, market access and mobility for 
MENA states—were to be conditional on their movement toward democratization. In 
practice, this was overtaken by events such as the failure of Egypt’s democratic 
transition. Little conditionality was enforced and, as a result of Europe’s economic 
recession, little funding provided to assist democratization. More than this, Western 
dominated IFIs set out to use the economic crisis in MENA countries such as Egypt, to 
reinforce demands for austerity, thereby undermining the conditions for 
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democratization and indeed, stability in the Mediterranean south. The EU had no 
alternative approach except more of the same combination of neo-liberal economics 
and exhortation of political democratization that had helped de-stabilize MENA in the 
first place. (Teti 2012:  Issac 2012; Balfour 2012) 
 However, as what had begun as a Middle East crisis soon became a European 
one, as failed states in MENA generated massive refugees flows and became breeding 
grounds for terrorism, EU policy shifted to containment of the blowback in Europe.  
Initially, there was broad public sympathy in Germany, Sweden, and Austria for the 
plight of the refugees. However, in mid-2015 a mass inflow of asylum seekers 
threatened internal political stability. Europe’s capacity for joint action to manage the 
crisis rapidly fell behind the surge in migrant numbers, sparking recriminations among 
EU members; front-line states such as Italy or Greece had to absorb the influx that 
Germany’s Chancellor Merkel’s public welcome to refugees had encouraged. Following 
the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015-16, fear that migrant flows would 
harbour terrorists led to further securitization of the refugee issue (Lehne 2016). The 
ability to control borders is a key attribute of sovereignty and nationhood, and, as Walt 
put it, if Europe cannot control access to its own territory, it will not be able to control 
its political fate either: “The danger is migration that alters local communities too 
rapidly and appears to be beyond the control of local, national, or EU-level authorities.” 
(Walt 2016) 
 Faced with this threat, a new European consensus emerged that the flow of 
refugees had to be controlled by reinforcing the EU’s external border. Funding 
increased for “humanitarian containment”—the use of aid to care for refugees in the 
Middle East, notably Syria’s neighbours, to prevent a their spill-over into Europe. 
Border and coastguards were beefed up. Europe also sought agreements with bordering 
states to close migrant channels across their territory; in the most important such 
agreement that of the EU and Turkey, initialled in March 2016, Ankara committed to 
take back immigrants that transited Turkey to Greece and the EU to accept an 
equivalent number of asylum seekers up to 72,000 and to liberalize visas for Turkish 
citizens traveling to the EU (Youngs and Gutman 2015; Koser 2012; Lehne 2016).  
  Ironically, the crisis unleashed by the Arab uprisings soon threatened the very 
survival of the EU. European states began trying to take back some of the sovereignty 
they had delegated to the EU, in the first place over borders, the main symbol of 
sovereignty. The migrant crisis threatened the Schengen Agreement on open borders, 
“one of the EU’s singular accomplishments (as well as a tangible symbol of unity)”, as 
Walt (2016) observed. It encouraged the growth of right-wing populist parties that so 
effectively tapped into and mobilized both anti-migrant and anti-EU sentiment across 
Europe that mainstream parties were also forced to take stands against mass migration. 
Growing Eurosepticism fuelled by the migration crisis was most extremely manifested 
in the campaign for Britain’s exit form the EU, which seriously threatened the European 
project. The European states that had started by belittling the sovereignty claims of 
MENA states, now struggled to reclaim their own under pressures emanating from 
MENA.  
Conclusion 
Britain and France exported the Westphalian states system to the Middle East but in a 
flawed form that had conflict and instability built into it. As Europe shed its imperial 
past, the US assumed the role of world hegemon, deploying hard power to contain 
Middle East conflicts and to secure the region’s oil. Europe sought, thru the EMP, to 
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export its experience of economic integration and democratization as an alternative 
solution to MENA’s instability (Youngs 2004). In practice, the EMP aimed less at 
partnership than at assimilation of the south to the neo-liberal practices of the north, 
thereby promoting the reconstruction of the hub and spokes structure typical of 
imperialism. Increasingly, too, Europe became a partner in the project of US hegemony 
over the region.  
 The contradictions in European policy, between the fostering of crony capitalism 
and of regime de-legitimizing democratic discourses, and between partnership with 
MENA and with a Washington whose policies exacerbated MENA instability, largely 
nullified any stabilizing effect that EMP might have had. Moreover, the post-sovereignty 
discourse disseminated from Europe fundamentally misread the situation in the 
southern Mediterranean. The Arab Uprising showed that democracy (or more precisely 
democratic capitalism) can only be exported at great risk of destabilizing fragile states; 
that such social engineering is quite beyond the capacity of external powers; and that 
the regional state, authoritarian or not, is the only bulwark against anarchy—civil war, 
mass migration and terrorism. Western policies were decisive in creating, within 
roughly a decade, three failed states in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. These failed states (as 
earlier in Afghanistan) then became the sites of “blowback,” posing the dual threats of 
terrorism and mass migration—and in consequence threatening the very survival of the 
European project. 
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